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A B S T R A C T   
Research often suggests that population ageing will be detrimental for the economy due to increased labour 
market exits and lost productivity, however the role of population health and disability at older ages is not well 
established. We estimate the relationship between the size of the older working age population and economic 
growth across 180 countries from 1990 to 2017 to explore whether a healthy older working age population, as 
measured by age-specific Years Lived with Disability (YLDs), can moderate the relationship between an ageing 
labour force and real per capita GDP growth. Using country and year fixed effects models, we find that although 
an increase in the 55–69 year old share of the total population is associated with a reduction in real per capita 
GDP growth, the decline in economic growth is moderated if the population at that age is in good health. To 
demonstrate the magnitude of effects, we present model predicted real per capita GDP growth for a selection of 
countries from 2020 through 2100 comparing the 2017 country-specific baseline YLD rate to a simulated 5% 
improvement in YLDs. Our findings demonstrate that economic slowdowns attributable to population ageing are 
avoidable through policy interventions supporting healthy and active ageing.   
1. Introduction 
Countries around the world are ageing, as longer life expectancies 
coupled with decreases in fertility rates cause the share of older people 
in the population to increase. These changes in population age mix are 
contributing to an ageing labour force. Globally, the median age of the 
labour force – which encompasses people of working age who are either 
employed or who are unemployed but willing to work – has increased 
from 37.6 years in 2010 to 38.9 years in 2019, with the largest increases 
in Southern Europe (3.3 years), Eastern Asia (2.6 years), South Eastern 
Asia (2.0 years), and South America (2.0 years). In 2019, the regions 
with the oldest labour forces were Southern Europe (median age of 43.9 
years), Western Europe (43.2 years) and Eastern Asia (42.1 years) (In-
ternational Labor Organization, 2020). 
While keeping people in paid work at older ages may be desirable 
from a fiscal sustainability perspective, particularly where there are 
concerns regarding the sustainability of public pension outlays (Nau-
mann, 2014), there are suggestions that an older labour force may have 
adverse effects for the economy (Feyrer, 2007, 2008, 2008; Werding, 
2008; Westelius and Liu, 2016). These effects may occur through a 
number of mechanisms, including potentially lower labour productivity 
among older workers or insufficient labour market participation at older 
ages due to high rates of retirement (Axelrad, 2018; Fisher et al., 2016; 
Van Rijn et al., 2014). 
The ongoing ageing of the labour force raises questions globally 
about whether negative economic outcomes associated with changes in 
the size of the older working age population are likely to occur in 
practice, and whether there are factors that can mitigate any adverse 
economic effects. For example, the relationship between population age- 
structure and economic growth may vary depending on a wide range of 
characteristics of older people, such as their education levels 
(Börsch-Supan, 2003; Nagarajan et al., 2016; National Research Council, 
2012; Vogel et al., 2017; Werding, 2008), their use of new 
productivity-enhancing technologies (Aksoy et al., 2019; Fougère and 
Mérette, 1999), or their health and disability status (Van Rijn et al., 
2014; Axelrad, 2018). 
In this paper we focus on the role of health and disability among the 
older working-age population. One might expect that a healthy older 
population will be able to remain active and productive for longer, 
potentially moderating some of the otherwise detrimental economic 
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effects associated with an ageing labour force (Van den Berg et al., 
2010). Identifying whether the health of older people affects economic 
outcomes however is challenging due to methodological issues, since 
individuals’ work at older ages is endogenous with their health and 
other person level characteristics. Likewise, studies of individual-level 
data cannot identify how changes in the size of the older population 
affects the macroeconomy. 
We use country level panel data disaggregated by age group to test 
whether a healthier older working age population, measured by age- 
specific Years Lived with Disability (YLDs), can moderate the relation-
ship between changes in the size of the older working-age population 
and real per capita GDP growth. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
to empirically investigate the links between an ageing labour force, 
health and disability at older ages, and the economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first review the existing 
literature linking population age structure to the economy to guide our 
empirical approach. We then describe the data and methods used for our 
analysis. Next we present model results and a simulation for selected 
countries to illustrate how an older working-age population with levels 
of disability lower than those reported in the base year, 2017, could be 
expected to alter GDP growth rates in the future. We conclude by dis-
cussing the results and consider policy implications. 
2. Literature review 
The relationship between population age structure and the economy 
has often been quantified empirically in the literature by regressing 
economic indicators on population shares by age group and reporting 
the estimated coefficients. Following this approach, researchers typi-
cally find an ‘inverse-U’ or ‘hump’-shaped relationship, where younger 
and older age groups are associated with comparatively worse economic 
outcomes and those in the middle ages associated with comparatively 
better economic outcomes. 
In their seminal paper, Fair and Dominguez (1991) were among the 
first to take this empirical approach to estimate the effects of changes in 
US population age distributions from 1954 through 1988 on macro-
economic aggregates including consumption, saving rates, money de-
mand and labour force participation using population shares by age as 
the main regressors (Fair and Dominguez, 1991). Lindh and Malmberg 
(1999, 2009) later investigate the effects of changes in age distributions 
on economic growth by analysing data for OECD countries from 1950 to 
1990, finding a positive relationship between increases in the share of 
middle-aged people (50–64 years) and economic growth, but strong 
negative effects of increases in the share 65+ (Lindh and Malmberg, 
1999, 2009). Persson (2004) incorporates age distributions into eco-
nomic growth models and similarly finds negative associations between 
per capita income growth and increases in population shares aged 0 to 
14 and over 65 in the US between 1930 and 2000 (Persson, 2004). This 
is likewise consistent with Aksoy et al. (2019) who find that the young 
and older age shares of the population correlate with reduced output 
growth and positive inflationary pressures in the long-run across OECD 
economies (Aksoy et al., 2019). 
These associations appear to be robust across a range of different 
country settings. In addition to the aforementioned studies, Bloom et al. 
(2008) and Dao (2012), respectively, show that the decrease in the 
working-age population share and the rise in the old-age dependency 
ratio have a statistically significant negative association with economic 
growth, both in Asia and in developing countries (Bloom et al., 2008; 
Dao, 2012). Maestas et al. (2016) find that in the US, a 10% increase in 
the share of the population aged 60+ is associated with a decline in GDP 
per capita growth by 5.5% (Maestas et al., 2016). 
Researchers also investigate the economic effects associated specif-
ically with an ageing labour force. Using panel data from developed and 
developing countries between 1960 and 1990, Feyrer (2007, 2008) 
simulates the impact of labour force ageing on total factor productivity 
and per capita GDP growth (Feyrer, 2007, 2008). The author finds that 
the inverse U-shaped relationship between labour force age structure 
and productivity growth peaks between ages 40 and 49 (Feyrer, 2007). 
An inverted U-shaped peak between ages 40 and 49 for total factor 
productivity is also found by Werding (2008) for OECD countries and 
Liu and Westlius (2016) for Japan (Werding, 2008; Westelius and Liu, 
2016). Aiyar and Ebeke (2016) build on Feyrer’s model and estimate 
that workforce ageing in Europe will decrease total factor productivity 
by 0.2 percentage points annually from 2014 to 2035 (Aiyar and Ebeke, 
2016). 
Other research challenges the association between an older labour 
force and decreases in labour productivity and economic growth (Ace-
moglu and Restrepo, 2017; Börsch-Supan and Weiss, 2016; National 
Research Council, 2012; Siliverstovs et al., 2011). For example, diffi-
culties performing manual and intensive physical work among older 
workers may be countered by traits that improve with age including 
experience, maturity, a wider network and ability to work collabora-
tively and prevent low frequency problems (Bloom et al., 2015; 
Börsch-Supan, 2003; Börsch-Supan et al., 2021; Börsch-Supan and 
Weiss, 2016; Prskawetz et al., 2006). Burtless (2013) shows that by 
taking average earnings as a measure of labour productivity, older 
people appear to be more productive since their labour force partici-
pation and earnings increase faster than their younger counterparts 
(Burtless, 2013). 
Researchers have identified technology adoption by older people and 
education levels as two factors that can potentially moderate the rela-
tionship between population age-structure and the economy. The use of 
new technologies by older workers has been shown to compensate for 
some of the declines in growth and productivity associated with ageing 
(Aksoy et al., 2019; Fougère and Mérette, 1999). Börsch-Supan (2003) 
estimates that greater use of technology boosts labour productivity by 
6% (Börsch-Supan, 2003). Similarly, the Asian Economic Integration 
Report (2019) estimates that technology adoption adds up to 5 addi-
tional years of productive labour. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) and 
Kaniovski and Url (2019) argue that population ageing encourages 
digitalisation and use of robot technologies, increasing labour produc-
tivity and capital efficiency, which in turn induces economic growth 
(Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017; Kaniovski and Url, 2019). 
Education and training have also been shown to be important de-
terminants of both technological adoption as well as increased produc-
tivity at older ages (Börsch-Supan, 2003; Nagarajan et al., 2016; 
National Research Council, 2012; Vogel et al., 2017; Werding, 2008). 
Burtless (2013) and Maestas et al. (2016) show that higher educational 
attainment among older people extends their participation in the labour 
force (Burtless, 2013; Maestas et al., 2016). Since on average, the cur-
rent older generation has higher educational attainment compared with 
older cohorts in prior years, one would expect them to participate in the 
workforce for longer (National Research Council, 2012; Prskawetz et al., 
2006). 
While no studies have investigated the role of health as a moderating 
factor in the association between population age structure and the 
economy, health plays an important role in individual labour market 
decisions (Axelrad, 2018; Berg et al., 2010, Van Rijn et al., 2014). Data 
from the Health and Retirement Study shows that around one-fourth of 
workers aged between 60 and 61 will most likely have a disability that 
hinders their work capacity (National Research Council, 2012). 
Rehkopf, Adler, and Rowe (2011) find that increases in disability 
decrease older people’s likelihood of remaining in the workforce 
(Rehkopf et al., 2011). Similarly, Berg et al. (2010) show poor 
self-perceived health and to a lesser extent, chronic diseases, mobility 
problems and daily activity limitations are associated with older Euro-
peans exiting the workforce (Berg et al., 2010). Poor health is a 
well-established risk factor for leaving paid employment, with those in 
poor health typically transitioning into unemployment, disability pen-
sions, as well as early retirement (Van Rijn et al., 2014). 
Overall, the literature suggests that increases in the share of older 
people in the population is negatively associated with GDP per capita 
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growth and labour productivity across a range of country settings. The 
inverted U-shaped relationship between age and economic growth 
seems to peak for those in their 40s and decline thereafter. Nevertheless, 
variations in human capital may play a key role, as evidence suggests 
more educated and well-trained older people are more likely to be 
productive and remain attached to the labour market as they age, which 
in turn can mitigate the adverse economic effects associated with 
changing age-structures. 
3. Data 
We use country level panel data from multiple publicly available 
sources. Real (i.e. price inflation-adjusted) per capita GDP in local cur-
rency units (LCU) is extracted from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and used to calculate GDP growth rates; we use real as 
opposed to nominal (i.e. non-price-inflation adjusted) per capita GDP 
because it better captures the value of economic output per person over 
time. Historical and forecasted population by age data is obtained from 
the United Nations World Population Prospects; we use the medium 
variant projection as our population by age forecast. 
Age-specific Years Lived with Disability (YLDs) are our measure of 
health and disability (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 
(IHME), 2018). YLDs are a measure of disease burden estimated by 
multiplying the prevalence of a condition by a weight reflecting its 
severity. YLDs are preferable to Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) 
for our purposes because DALYs include both YLDs and premature 
deaths. 
All together, historical data are available for 180 countries from 
1990 to 2017; population by age forecasts are available through 2100. 
4. Methods 
Following the methods that have been traditionally used in the 
literature to estimate the relationship between population age structure 
and the economy as our starting point, we regress GDP growth on 
population age shares to estimate the association between population 
age-mix and economic growth and ultimately explore the potential 
moderating role of health and disability among the older working-age 
population. Our hypothesis is that while population ageing may be 
detrimental for the economy if older people are in poor health, causing 
them to be unproductive or unable to participate in the labour market, a 
comparatively healthier and disability-free older population can retain 
sufficient human capital to continue to be productive at older ages, 
contributing positively to economic growth. 
We use both annual growth in real per capita GDP and the five-year 
average of annual growth in real per capita GDP as dependent variables. 
There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches; while 
annual data can be noisy, 5-year averages may distort business cycles 
and smooth relevant variations over time (Attanasio et al., 2000). 
As discussed, the literature makes use of models that include a range 
of population age groupings, from each individual year of age to much 
more aggregated age groups as explanatory variables. This approach, 
despite its pervasiveness, could however be problematic due to corre-
lations between population age shares within countries; we use an 
adapted but more pragmatic methodology. We begin by modelling real 
per capita GDP growth as a function of three aggregated age groupings 
covering working-ages between 20 and 69: the young working age 
(20–39), the mid-working age (40–54) and the older working-age 
(55–69). 
























Log differenced real per capita GDP (or alternatively, the 5-year 
centred average of log differenced real per capita GDP, not shown in 
the equations) in country i and year t is modelled as a function of pop-
ulation age shares in country i and t. We include country fixed effects to 
control for all time invariant country characteristics and year fixed ef-
fects to capture developments over time that affect the entire sample. 
The aim of this model is to confirm the established inverted U-shaped 
relationship between population age-structure and GDP growth. 
For the remainder of the paper we resort to a more parsimonious 
modelling approach that first includes only the 55–69 year old popula-















Taking a stepwise approach, we then incorporate health and 
disability among the older-working age group in the form of the inverse 
of YLDs per person among the 55–69 year old population (model 3). We 
use the inverse of YLDs per person to facilitate interpretation of the 




















Model 4 incorporates both the main effect of the inverse of YLDs and 
the interaction between YLDs and the older working-age population 
share. Incorporating the interaction term tests whether any adverse ef-
fects of a larger older working-age population are moderated by the 


















Lastly, we also incorporate the log of real per capita GDP (at t-2 for 
the annual growth models, as shown in (5) below, and at t-3 for the 5- 
year centred average) to account for a range of country-specific time 
varying characteristics that correlate with the level of GDP per capita; 
such characteristics could include technological innovation, education, 


















All models used robust standard errors (Abadie et al., 2017). To ac-
count for potential serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, as a 
robustness check we ran all models with Newey-West standard errors. 
Allowing for lags up to at least 10 years there were no relevant differ-
ences in standard errors. 
To better understand the magnitude of potential effects we use our 
preferred model to forecast GDP growth from 2020 through the 2100 for 
a selection of countries. We present the predicted real per capita GDP 
growth under a ‘healthy ageing’ scenario where YLDs for 55–69 year 
olds are 5% lower in the forecast period than they were in 2017, 
compared to a baseline scenario that holds 2017 health and disability 
rates constant. 
5. Results 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample of 180 countries can be 
found in Table 1. There are a few extreme outliers and relatively high 
variance for annual real per capita GDP growth; taking the 5-year 
average reduces this variability substantially. The mean country-year 
had 9.1% of its population between ages 55–69. 
Fig. 1 shows a historical albeit weak correlation between the share of 
the population age 55–69 and economic growth. Using country means to 
center the 5-year average GDP per capita growth data, prior to model-
ling, country observations with high shares of their population between 
ages 55–69 have slightly lower than average real per capita GDP growth 
(correlation = − 0.0358, p < 0.05). 
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The main model results are in Table 2. The initial models confirm the 
findings in the literature of an inverse-U or hump-shaped relationship 
between population age shares and economic growth. Using both annual 
and 5-year average growth as dependent variables (columns 1 and 2, 
respectively), we find that increases in the young working-age and older 
working-ages are associated with slowdowns in economic growth, while 
increases in the size of the mid-working age population are associated 
with higher economic growth. The models of 5-year average annual 
growth have comparatively better goodness of fit (R2 of 0.380 compared 
to R2 of 0.153). In this model (column 2), according to point estimates, a 
1 percentage point increase in the 55–69 year old share of the total 
population is associated with a reduction in real per capita GDP growth 
of 0.674 percentage points. 
Dropping the young working age and mid-working age population 
shares in Model 2 to avoid within-country correlations between popu-
lation age shares, the coefficient on the 55–69 year old population share 
remains negative and statistically significant at p < 0.001 (Table 2, 
columns 3 and 4). Incorporating the main effect of the inverse of YLDs 
among 55–69 year olds in Model 3 (Table 2, columns 5 and 6), we find 
the point estimate of the inverse of YLDs is positive but not statistically 
significant in the case of the annual GDP growth model. In the 5 year 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics, 1990–2017, 180 countries.   
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation n 
Annual real per capita GDP growth (%) 1.9 2.2 − 105.0 87.7 6.3 4679 
5-year average real per capita GDP growth (%) 2.1 2.0 − 23.6 36.7 3.6 3955 
20-39 share of total population (%) 30.4 29.8 20.6 60.5 4.0 4679 
40-54 share of total population (%) 15.2 14.7 6.9 27.7 4.6 4679 
55-69 share of total population (%) 9.1 7.4 2.3 21.1 4.6 4679 
YLD per 10000 population 202.6 187.3 111.2 7251.9 292.3 4679  
Fig. 1. Line of best fit, 55–69 year old population share vs. mean-centred 5- 
year average real per capita GDP. 
Table 2 
Model results for pooled sample of all countries.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 




































20–39 − 0.192*** − 0.159***          
(0.0514) (0.0337)         
40–54 0.156* 0.219***          
(0.0750) (0.0511)         
55–69 − 0.645*** − 0.673*** − 0.454*** − 0.523*** − 0.459*** − 0.558*** − 1.011** − 1.281*** − 0.869** − 1.107***  
(0.108) (0.0800) (0.101) (0.0779) (0.0983) (0.0794) (0.330) (0.241) (0.296) (0.216) 
1/YLD per 
person 
(55–69)     
0.950 7.086** − 5.814 − 1.766 0.319 0.967      
(4.561) (2.708) (6.956) (4.318) (6.288) (4.076) 
55–69 x 1/ 
YLD per 
person 
(55–69)       
96.07 126.7*** 101.1* 137.3***        
(51.25) (38.38) (47.05) (36.13) 
ln(real GDP 
per capita)t- 
2         




3          
− 0.0909***           
(0.00602) 
Country FE           
Year FE                      
Constant 0.0694** 0.0826*** 0.0224 0.0501*** 0.0167 0.00775 0.0567 0.0597* 1.460*** 1.474***  
(0.0246) (0.0134) (0.0186) (0.0101) (0.0325) (0.0190) (0.0454) (0.0269) (0.179) (0.0977)            
Observations 4679 3955 4679 3955 4679 3955 4679 3955 4498 3955 
R-squared 0.153 0.380 0.150 0.370 0.150 0.372 0.150 0.373 0.249 0.573  
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average GDP growth model the coefficient is positive and significant at 
p < 0.01, suggesting that better health among the 55–69 year old pop-
ulation is associated with higher GDP growth irrespective of the size of 
that population. Model 4 (Table 2, columns 7 and 8) incorporates both 
main effects, the interaction between the inverse of YLDs and the 55–69 
year old population share, and country and year fixed effects. In both 
models, the interaction is positive, but only in the 5 year average GDP 
growth model is the interaction statistically significant at p < 0.001 
(Beta = 126.7). Lastly, the inclusion of lagged GDP per capita levels 
(Table 2, columns 9 and 10) in Model 5 is statistically significant at p <
0.001 and negative, suggesting slower GDP growth in countries at 
higher levels of economic development per person; the interaction term 
is positive and significant in both of these models (Beta = 101.1, p <
0.05 for the annual growth model; Beta = 137.3, p < 0.001 for the 5-year 
average growth model). 
Models with interaction terms are notoriously challenging to inter-
pret (Brambor et al., 2006). To better understand the potential moder-
ating effect of health on economic growth conditional on the size of the 
older working age population, we explore the results of Model 5 (Table 2 
Column 10) as our preferred model specification, although it is impor-
tant to note that model coefficients are reasonably stable across the 
specifications tested. Fig. 2 presents predicted real per capita GDP 
growth for all sizes of the older working age population in the sample, 
comparing a good health scenario (i.e. where the inverse of YLDs is 
assumed to be one standard deviation above the sample mean) and a 
poor health scenario (i.e. where the inverse of YLDs is one standard 
deviation below the mean). Point estimates indicate that larger older 
working age populations are associated with slower real per capita GDP 
growth under both scenarios, although there is some overlap in confi-
dence intervals within each of the scenarios. Among very small-sized 
populations between ages 55–69 there is no statistical difference in 
predicted real per capita GDP growth between the good health and poor 
health scenarios, while for country-years with larger shares of the 
population at older working ages, the difference between having that 
population in good health vs poor health becomes statistically signifi-
cant at 95% confidence levels. At the mean share of the population at 
age 55–69 across all country-years over the sample period (9.1%), the 
model predicted real GDP growth for the good health scenario (2.93%, 
95% CI 2.65; 3.22) and poor health scenario (0.92%, 95% CI 0.54, 1.29) 
are statistically different from each other at 95% confidence levels. 
We next present a contour plot based on the preferred model 
specification to further explore the interaction between the share of the 
older working-age population and the health of that population (Fig. 3). 
This shows how the model predicted relationship between the share of 
the older working-age population (x-axis) and real per capita GDP 
growth (contours) varies depending on the health of the older working 
age population (y-axis); the interaction term is what causes the curva-
ture of the contour lines. Larger populations aged 55–69 are generally 
associated with lower predicted real per capita GDP growth. However, 
for country-years where the inverse of YLDs among 55–69 year olds is 
high (i.e. the older working age population is in relatively good health), 
economic growth is predicted to be higher. At the highest levels of good 
health on the y-axis, the effect of the size of the older working-age 
population on real per capita GDP growth is effectively eliminated, so 
that countries are predicted to have similar levels of GDP growth irre-
spective of the size of their 55–69 year old population. 
6. Simulation 
To further facilitate interpretation of the model results, we simulate 
the effects of improved health at older ages on future real per capita GDP 
growth for a selection of countries. Again using the preferred model 
specification, we compare a scenario where YLDs for 55–69 year olds for 
2017 are held constant for each country over the forecast period through 
2100 to an alternative scenario where YLDs are held constant but 5% 
lower than in 2017. This enables us to quantify the gains in real per 
capita GDP growth associated with a healthy older working-age popu-
lation on a country-by-country basis. 
Fig. 4 contains simulated results from 2020 to 2100 for 7 diverse 
countries at varying stages of age-demographic transition: Austria, 
Brazil, Egypt, Finland, Singapore, South Africa and Thailand. In all 
countries, real per capita GDP is expected to grow faster if older 
working-age people are in better health with fewer YLDs. A 5% 
improvement in YLDs is associated with at minimum 0.3% predicted 
additional annual real per capita GDP growth (Egypt and South Africa in 
2020). Across all 180 countries, the largest predicted annual gain 
associated with a 5% improvement in YLDs is in Singapore (1.4% in 
2027). The simulation suggests that these sustained health improve-
ments among the older working-age population would be expected to 
increase real per capita GDP in Singapore by 179% in total between 
2020 and 2100, the largest aggregate effect of any country over the 
projection period. 
Fig. 2. Predicted 5-year average real per capita GDP growth and the share of 
the population at older working-age (55–69), good health vs poor health sce-
narios. Note: Good health is defined here as 1 standard deviation below the 
mean of the inverse of YLDs among 55–69 year olds; Poor health is defined as 1 
standard deviation above the mean of the inverse of YLDs among 55–69 
year olds. 
Fig. 3. Contour plot of population age share 55-69, inverse of YLDs, and real 
GDP growth based on Model 5. 
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7. Discussion 
In this paper we consider the relationship between health and 
disability at older working-ages and economic growth in the context of 
population ageing. We find broadly consistent results across a range of 
model specifications. While a larger share of the older working-age 
population at ages 55–69 has historically been associated with slower 
real per capita GDP growth, we find that if the population in that age 
range has low levels of disability, the expected adverse economic effects 
are reduced or even eliminated altogether. Below we discuss the results 
in more detail and consider policy implications. 
Our models find small but significant effects of changes in population 
age shares on real per capita GDP growth. Point estimates from our 
preferred model (Table 2 Column 10) indicate a 1 percentage point 
change in the share of the population aged 55–69 is associated with a 
reduction in GDP growth of 1.1 percentage points. It is important to note 
however that between 1990 and 2017 in our sample of 180 countries, 
the median annual change in the share of the population aged 55–69 is 
0.058 percentage points, which implies an effect of just 0.06% on real 
per capita GDP growth in the median country-year based on model co-
efficients. This suggests that population age-structure on its own plays 
only a minor role in determining year to year economic growth any-
ways, regardless of the health or disability status of that population. 
We employ a range of approaches – margins, contour plots, and 
simulations – to understand the interaction between the health and size 
of the older working-age population. We find that even relatively small 
differences in health at older ages can have statistically significant ef-
fects on how population ageing affects economic growth, although there 
was no difference in predicted real per capita GDP growth in Fig. 2 when 
older-working age populations were small. Additionally, the contour 
plot (Fig. 3) suggests that for country-years with large older working-age 
populations, the health of that population has played an instrumental 
role in determining how ageing affects economic growth, whereas for 
country-years with very small older-working age populations (approxi-
mately 5% of total population or less) the health of the older-working 
age population is of less relevance to economic growth. This is to be 
expected, particularly in settings where people aged 55–69 years old 
may be less likely to contribute to the formal economy. Nevertheless, the 
simulation results reveal that improvements in health at older ages are 
likely to have positive economic effects in the coming years, even 
amongst countries that are at an early stage of the age-demographic 
transition. 
While there are a number of possible pathways linking population 
age-structure to economic growth, in this paper we focus our attention 
on the role of ageing of the labour force. Consistent with the literature, 
our initial models find a negative association between increases in the 
share of people at both younger and older working-ages and economic 
growth. For younger working-age adults, this result may potentially be 
explained by inexperience or high rates of youth unemployment in some 
settings, whereas for older working-age adults, the negative coefficient 
might be explained by low productivity or high rates of exiting the 
workforce (Van Rijn et al., 2014; Axelrad, 2018). Both of these mecha-
nisms are affected by health and disability. It is therefore reassuring that 
we consistently find a significant positive interaction between disability 
and the share of the population at ages 55–69, as it not only provides 
some support for the aforementioned causal pathways linking an ageing 
labour force to economic growth, but also suggests that adverse eco-
nomic effects associated with an ageing labour force are amenable to 
policy intervention. 
There are a number of limitations to this analysis. First, while the 
methods we use cannot confirm that age shares have a causal effect on 
economic growth in the first place, we base our analysis on the ap-
proaches used commonly in the literature. Additionally, although we 
assume that the primary pathway linking the older working-age share of 
the population to economic growth is through participation in the la-
bour force, the reduced form analysis makes use of the entire population 
at working ages rather than just those in the active labour force. This has 
some drawbacks because it is imprecise and does not reflect the actual 
percentage of the population in the labour market at each age. However, 
using the active labour force would also be problematic because it is 
likely to be endogenous with health if people leave the labour force due 
to poor health. It is also possible that population health, measured as 
YLDs, could also affect the overall age distributions, for example, if 
people in poor health die prematurely since this would affect survival 
into older age groups. We believe this is unlikely to be a major problem 
for our analysis since we focus on working-ages, where in most countries 
the probability of survival is relatively high irrespective of within- 
country variations in health and disability rates. 
Fig. 4. Forecasted gains in real per capita GDP growth associated with a 5% improvement in YLDs, selected countries, 2020-2100.  
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Further, it is important to note that many of the historical relation-
ships between age and work may change in the future anyways as the 
nature of work changes, resulting in variability in how age and health 
affect labour productivity and labour market decisions; our models are 
unable to capture this. Lastly, although it is well known that IHME data 
is modelled in some countries, it is the only source with age-specific 
YLDs available across time for all countries. 
This paper demonstrates the economic gains associated with pro-
moting healthy and active ageing of the labour force. Policymakers 
concerned about the adverse economic effects of population ageing and 
an ageing workforce should consider the potential benefits associated 
with investing in health, rather than use population ageing as an excuse 
to dismantle the welfare state (Cylus et al., 2019; Greer et al., 2021). 
Investments in health can lead to economic gains for countries at all 
stages of age-demographic transition; those countries with relatively 
young populations in particular may reap significant benefits by acting 
early to promote healthy and active ageing. 
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Börsch-Supan, A., 2003. Labor market effects of population aging. Lab. Travail 17, 5–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9914.17.specialissue.2. 
Börsch-Supan, A., Hunkler, C., Weiss, M., 2021. Big data at work: age and labor 
productivity in the service sector. J. Econ. Ageing 19, 100–319. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.jeoa.2021.100319. 
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